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Abstract
Existing approaches to assess the economic impact of climate policies tend to overlook the
financial sector and to focus only on direct effects of policies on the specific institutional sector
they target, neglecting possible feedbacks between sectors, thus, underestimating the overall
policy effect. To fill in this gap, we develop a methodology based on financial networks, which
allows for analyzing the transmission throughout the economy of positive or negative shocks
induced by the introduction of specific climate policies. We apply the methodology to empirical
data of the Euro Area to identify the feedback loops between the financial sector and the
real economy both through direct and indirect chains of financial exposures across multiple
financial instruments. By focusing on climate policy-induced shocks that affect directly either
the banking sector or non-financial firms, we analyze the reinforcing feedback loops that could
amplify the effects of shocks on the financial sector and then cascade on the real economy.
Our analysis helps to understand the conditions for virtuous or vicious cycles to arise in the
climate-finance nexus and to provide a comprehensive assessment of the economic impact of
climate policies.
Keywords: financial networks, feedback loops, climate policies, shock transmission channels,
indirect effects, low-carbon transition.
Highlights:
• We propose a methodology to assess the economic impact of climate policies
• It builds on financial macro-network analysis across multiple instruments
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• We apply this methodology to empirical data of financial exposures in the Euro Area
• We analyze climate policy-induced shock transmission on finance/economic sectors
• We identify critical feedback loops that reinforce the climate policy-induced shocks
1. Introduction1
Climate change has been recognized as a main source of risk not only for ecosystems and2
societies but also for the performance of the real economy (IPCC, 2014) and for the stability3
of the financial system (Carney, 2015; ESRB, 2016). Indeed, in order to limit the negative4
impact of human activities on the climate, there is a need for a reallocation of private and5
public financial investments from carbon-intensive to low-carbon economic activities (HLEG-6
Sust-Fin, 2017). There is a broad consensus on the fact that such reallocation of financial7
capital is not possible through purely market-based solutions and that ambitious economic8
policies aimed to foster the transition to a low-carbon economy, i.e. climate policies hereafter,9
are needed (EC, 2015; Maxton and Randers, 2016). In turn, the introduction of climate policies10
comes with a significant risk for those financial investors who are locked-in into high-carbon11
investments (the so-called climate transition risk, Carney, 2015), and thus exposed to a loss12
of value resulting from "carbon stranded assets" (Leaton, 2012; Caldecott and McDaniels,13
2014). Overall, the global climate "Value at Risk" (VaR) due to climate-induced physical14
damages has been estimated as approximately 24 trillion USD of lost financial asset (Dietz et al.,15
2016). Further, a climate stress-test of the financial system (Battiston et al., 2017) shows that16
the combined exposure of financial actors’ equity holdings portfolios to climate-policy-relevant17
sectors (i.e. sectors that are directly or indirectly responsible for greenhouse gases (GHG)18
emissions and thus more vulnerable in case of climate policies) is considerable, reaching up to19
45% of the equity portfolio of pension funds. In addition, financial actors’ interconnectedness20
across the interbank market and other markets could amplify distress through reverberation21
effects, with potential implications on systemic risk (Battiston et al., 2017). Indeed, in a mild22
scenario, volatility on climate-policy-relevant sectors affects individual financial actors while in23
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a severe scenario, systemic adverse effects could occur. These findings imply that the assessment24
of climate policies impacts on the financial system is crucial.25
This paper aims to investigate how economic shocks arising from the "too-late-and-too-26
sudden" introduction of climate policies (ESRB, 2016) can be amplified through feedback loops27
of chains of financial exposures in the economy. We start from the observation that climate28
change leads to technological and policy shocks that invalidate the Rational Expectations Hy-29
pothesis (REH). Indeed, there are several examples of climate-related technological and policy30
shocks on asset prices that market players are not able to fully anticipate even on average31
(Monasterolo et al., 2017). Examples of unanticipated technological shocks include the faster-32
than-expected decrease in renewable energy costs in last decade. Examples of unanticipated33
policy shocks include the fact that in 2014 most observers would not believe in the achievement34
of the Paris Agreement in 2015, while in 2016 most observers would not predict the subsequent35
US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017.36
These examples imply that, at a time scale relevant for decision making, agents’ expectations37
on prices can be incorrect, even on average. This fact contradicts the REH and implies the38
possibility of systematic mispricing of assets. In turn, the invalidation of the REH and the39
possibility of systematic mispricing has deep implications on the role of finance in the impact of40
policy shocks on the economy as a whole. Due to the fact that many markets are decentralized,41
the market players are exposed to counterparty risk through financial contracts. In these42
markets, the recovery rate r denotes the fraction of the nominal value of the contract that a43
party obtains from an obligor, in case of its default. If the REH does not hold and there is44
the possibility of systematic mispricing on a given asset class, then the recovery rate on the45
obligations of all actors directly exposed to that asset class can be significantly smaller than one,46
even in expectation. Since the obligations of those first actors are assets for the second group of47
actors, the expected value of the assets of the second group can be systematically overpriced. In48
a mark-to-market accounting environment where market players make decisions based on the49
expected value of their counterparties obligations, the initial mispricing on a given asset class50
implies the propagation of potential losses along the chains of financial contracts (Battiston51
et al., 2016c,b; Bardoscia et al., 2017). Further, as we show in this paper, the presence of52
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closed chains of contracts leads to feedback loops that not only propagate shocks from a sector53
to another but also amplify their magnitude. Because in todays economy financial contracts54
form intricate networks, and feedback loops are present at many levels, their role needs to55
be examined. In particular, climate policy shocks hitting actors in the financial system could56
cascade to those of the real economy, and the impact of this shocks could get amplified by57
the feedback loops that characterize the real-financial linkages. The process of financialization58
of the economy in the last two decades (Palley, 2016) suggests that the magnitude of the59
amplification effect could be increasing.60
In contrast, standard economic models for climate policies’ evaluation focus on the economic61
costs of climate policies (Nordhaus, 1993, 2016; Revesz et al., 2014), and in doing so, they62
tend to rely on the REH and to overlook the role of the financial sector. In particular, they63
neglect possible feedback loops between sectors and they are therefore unsuited to assess the64
full financial impact of climate policies on the economy. In order to fill this gap, we develop65
a methodology based on accounting principles and a multi-layer network analysis that aims to66
estimate the potential amplification of shocks along feedback loops consisting of closed chains67
of financial exposures among institutional sectors in the economy. Our approach contributes68
to understanding to what extent (possibly delayed) climate policies could lead to amplification69
effects in case of banks’ high leverage and a recovery rate lower than one. We estimate the70
main reinforcing feedback loops between the financial sector and the real economy based on71
Euro Area balance sheet and cross-sectors data.72
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a review of Related Work.73
In section 3, we present the Analytical results where we introduce our methodology based on74
multilayer financial networks for the analysis of direct and indirect effects of climate policies.75
In section 4, we present the Empirical results where we discuss data used in the study, and two76
mechanisms of climate policy shock transmission. We conclude with section 5, discussing the77
contribution of our methodology to climate-policy evaluation, which is followed by Appendix78
section containing the proofs of the propositions and other details.79
2. Related work80
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Policy-makers and regulators could play a defining role in meeting the Paris Agreement by81
designing the right incentives, and by implementing the adequate policy mix for a smooth low-82
carbon transition. In the current policy debate, the most discussed climate policies (and thus83
the more likely to be introduced in the near-future, see HLEG-Sust-Fin, 2018) are as follows:84
• Market-based solutions, such as a carbon tax, i.e. the introduction of a tax on carbon85
emissions produced by economic sectors and activities (CPLC, 2017),86
• Green macroprudential regulations such as differentiated banks’ capital requirements87
(Volz, 2017; HLEG-Sust-Fin, 2018),88
• Green unconventional monetary policies, such as a green Quantitative Easing (QE) im-89
plemented by the central bank through the purchase of green assets (e.g. green bonds)90
from the banks (Campiglio, 2016; Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018; Barkawi, 2017).91
In order for the financial sector to be a part of the sustainability solution, the discussion92
about the timing and magnitude of climate policies should explicitly target finance, for at least93
two reasons. First, the implementation of climate policies could imply shocks for the finan-94
cial system, and, in particular, for those financial actors who are both vulnerable yet relevant95
(Monasterolo et al., 2017). Second, the transition of the financial sector towards sustainability,96
including portfolios’ decarbonization and the introduction of novel financial instruments, is con-97
sidered as a precondition to achieving the EU2030 energy and climate targets (HLEG-Sust-Fin,98
2017). It follows that in order to design and implement effective and targeted climate policies,99
policy-makers need to rely on tools for economic policy analysis that provide information on100
the following:101
• The structure of the financial system and the relation between the financial system and102
the real economy (e.g. households, firms, government).103
• How shocks generated by the introduction of climate policies could spread through the net-104
work of interconnected financial actors (i.e. shock transmission channels), and from there105
to the sectors and agents of the real economy. Recent analyses show that the intercon-106
nectedness of financial institutions could amplify both positive and negative shocks and107
5
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073191 
significantly decrease the accuracy of estimations of default probabilities (Battiston et al.,108
2016a,b), thus, increasing the complexity of risk estimation.109
• The presence of reinforcing and balancing feedback loops and their effects through direct110
and indirect shocks’ transmission channels. For instance, the introduction of unconven-111
tional monetary policies (e.g. a green QE aimed to scale-up green capital investments)112
could induce shocks on the financial system (e.g. financial stranded assets) that could113
then affect the real economy (e.g. via shifting to green investments).114
The concept of feedback loops is fundamental and is at the core of the analysis of the115
mechanisms driving the behavior pattern of a system over time (Sterman, 2000; Meadows,116
2008). The analysis of feedback loops at work in a system allows to identify the presence of117
three main elements for climate policy analysis:118
• time delays between the imposition of a shock and further shocks due to the agents’119
reactions,120
• tipping points beyond which the characteristics of the system could dramatically change,121
• the presence of reinforcing mechanisms, which often give rise to problems of path-dependency.122
In addition, the analysis of the dynamic interplay of feedback loops contributes to the ex-123
planation of emerging non-linear behaviors that are often not intuitively understood and that124
could give rise to emerging, unintended, macroeconomic consequences. Despite aforementioned125
facts, the analysis of feedback loops is usually overlooked by existing approaches for climate and126
economic policy assessment, such as Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) (see for instance127
Kriegler et al., 2013) and Computable General Equilibrium Models (CGEs) (Böhringer and128
Löschel, 2006) and the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models (DSGEs). Therefore,129
Rezai and Stagl (2016) called for the development of a new generation of models in ecological130
macroeconomics to integrate the micro-foundations of the models with a meso- and macroeco-131
nomic analysis, including the consideration of modern financial system and the consideration132
of distributive effects. This would allow a better understanding of the feedback loops between133
6
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073191 
the ecosystem, the real economy and the financial sector, as well as to account for policies’134
distributive effects.135
CGE, IAM, and DSGEs are rooted on the neoclassical economic theory and have con-136
tributed by a great extent to the increasing attention of the economic discipline to the drivers137
and impacts of climate change, and to micro and macroeconomics stylized facts. In the last138
decade, some of these models have introduced relevant novelties, such as endogenous techno-139
logical innovation (e.g., the WITCH IAM, see Bosetti et al.,2006), and the differentiation of140
fossil fuel-based and renewable energy sources by energy industry (Kriegler et al., 2013; Calvin141
et al., 2013). DSGEs have also been complemented with relevant previously missing features142
(Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018) that allow the representation of real business cycles, the anal-143
ysis of unconventional monetary policies (Coibion et al., 2017; Saiki and Frost, 2014), a stylized144
description of a modern money system and endogenous money creation (Jakab and Kumhof,145
2014), and an environmental focus (Golosov et al., 2014; Annicchiarico and Di Dio, 2016).146
Nevertheless, there is growing concern among academics and practitioners that neither IAMs147
and CGEs (Balint et al., 2017; Farmer et al., 2015; Mercure et al., 2016) nor DSGE (Romer,148
2016; Blanchard, 2018; Haldane and Turrell, 2018; Stiglitz, 2018) are appropriate to adequately149
account for the drivers of endogenous feedbacks between interconnected financial actors, the150
nonlinearities and tipping points that characterize climate change, and the shocks’ transmission151
channels from climate policies to financial actors and actors of the real economy.152
The models’ common critical points can be summed up in the following:153
• the adoption of strong assumptions on markets and agents’ behaviors and expectations,154
where the economy is composed by representative agents that maximize a utility function155
(Kirman, 1992), thus reducing the number of possible equilibria to a single one, and156
immediately react to policies;157
• the assumption of optimal allocation of all resources in the Business As Usual (BAU)158
case, which neglects the possibility of underutilized or not efficiently utilized financial159
resources;160
• a very stylized representation of the financial sector (if any) that neglects money (i.e.161
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prices are relative prices), the importance of financial actors’ interconnectedness and162
real-financial linkages that can amplify shocks;163
• a limited understanding of modern money theory as regards the endogenous creation164
of money by credit institutions and the flow of money between the economic and the165
financial system (Wray, 2015; McLeay et al., 2014);166
• the representation of climate policies by adding emissions and their accumulation in the167
atmosphere. This leads to consideration of the climate mitigation as an additional con-168
straint and as a short-term cost rather than a long-term benefit for the economy (Wolf169
et al., 2016).170
Recently, also Stock-Flow Consistent modeling approaches (e.g. Dafermos et al. (2017))171
and Agent-Based Models (Lamperti et al., 2017) highlighted the economic cost (in terms of172
GDP) of climate policies. However, recent analyses show that win-win options could arise from173
the introduction of either fiscal or monetary policies aimed to mitigate climate change and to174
support the low-carbon transition (Lamperti et al., 2016; Ponta et al., 2016; Monasterolo and175
Raberto, 2018).176
In order to provide a comprehensive and robust assessment of climate policies’ impact on177
the financial system, and from there to the real economy, we need approaches able to overcome178
such limitations. In this paper, we explore the contribution of financial networks to analyze the179
direct and indirect effects of climate policies at the sector level, considering shock propagation180
and amplification from the financial sector to the real economy. To this extent, our analysis181
relates to the large stream of work investigating the propagation of distress in financial networks182
(Markose et al., 2017; Cimini et al., 2015; Battiston et al., 2016c). Financial networks consist of a183
set of both financial or non-financial firms and the financial contracts they establish among each184
other, including equity holdings, loans, tradable debt obligations (i.e. bonds) and derivatives.185
In a mark-to-market accounting environment, negative shocks on equity values of firms result186
in changes in the equities values of the other firms holding their debt obligations (Battiston187
et al., 2016c,b; Bardoscia et al., 2017). The mechanism works as follows: a decrease in firms’188
equity translates into an increase of its probability of defaulting on their obligations and, thus,189
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in a decrease in the value of firms’ obligations. Firms holding these obligations experience a190
decrease in value of their own asset side and, therefore, of their equity (as the difference between191
asset and liabilities).192
Recently, Barucca et al. (2016) have shown analytically how to describe the propagation of193
shocks across firms’ obligations while respecting the balance-sheet identity of all firms under194
very general conditions on the contracts, covering the case of loans and bonds. These conditions195
require, in simple terms, that upon a decrease in the equity value of the obligor, the valuation196
of its obligation can only decrease. This result is important in the context of the present paper197
because even when contracts are aggregated at the level of financial exposures among economic198
sectors, we can still argue that negative shocks on firms in one sector translate in negative199
shocks on the firms in another sector if the latter are exposed to debt obligations of firms in200
the first sector. The first step into the direction of estimation of shock propagation between201
the sectors was done by Castrén and Rancan (2014), where the authors introduced the concept202
of macro-networks to describe the set of financial linkages within the economy aggregated at203
the level of institutional sectors. Despite the large body of works in financial networks and204
the specific stream of works on macro-networks, only very recent work has been applying this205
approach to the context of climate policies. In particular, the network-based climate stress-test206
developed in Battiston et al. (2017) allows to assess the exposure of individual institutions to207
climate risk. In contrast, in this paper, we focus our analysis at the sector level.208
3. Analytical Results209
3.1. The financial macro-network approach210
At the micro-economic level, firms (e.g. individual banks, non-financial firms), households211
and governments establish financial contracts with each other through multiple financial in-212
struments (i.e. loans, equity, bonds, and insurance&pension schemes guarantees). As discussed213
in the introduction, economic actors cannot be assumed to fully anticipate shocks arising from214
climate change and associated policies. In this Section, with the aim to analyze how these215
shocks propagate through financial interdependencies and feedback loops between the financial216
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sectors and the real economy sectors, we take a financial macro-network approach at the sector217
level (Castrén and Rancan, 2014).218
This means that we look at the aggregated exposures of each institutional sector to the219
others, for each type of financial instrument. The advantage of analyzing an economy as a220
multilayer financial network calibrated on empirical data is threefold. First, we can estimate the221
direct and indirect financial dependencies in the economy. Second, by looking at closed chains222
of dependencies, we can identify the main feedback loops between the financial sector and the223
real economy, and analyze their drivers and intensity. Third, we use indirect dependencies and224
feedback loops to assess the main possible channels of shock transmission and amplification225
effect as a result of the introduction of late and sudden climate policies aimed at supporting226
the low-carbon transition.227
Remark 1. Before describing the methodology in more detail, a relevant remark applies. It228
may be tempting to think that in the economic system, since one agent’s asset is another agent’s229
liability, then, in the aggregate, assets and liabilities can be simply netted out. This intuition230
is correct under the following conditions: i) there are no bankruptcy costs and no information231
asymmetry (Visentin et al., 2016; Bardoscia et al., 2016, 2017), or ii) debt contracts are fully232
collateralized with recovery rate close to one (in case of counterparty’s default, Battiston et al.,233
2016c). However, in general, the above conditions do not hold and, as a result, the intuition234
about netting out is incorrect in many empirical situations that are relevant to the discussions235
on distress propagation and the impact of climate policies. Indeed, the presence of technological,236
scientific and policy shocks can hamper the ability of market players to fully anticipate price237
adjustments (even on average) of assets in the economic sectors directly involved in the low-238
carbon transition (Monasterolo et al., 2017). This means that we cannot rule out systematic239
mispricing of assets and hence the condition that recovery rates on contracts can be significantly240
smaller than one in case of counterparties’ default. Moreover, bankruptcy costs and asymmetry241
of information cannot be neglected, especially when markets are distressed (Battiston et al.,242
2016c). Under these conditions, it is legitimate and very important to look at the aggregate243
exposures without assuming the netting out of assets and liabilities. This fact has also been244
recognized by the ECB since the concept of financial macro-network was introduced to better245
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understand and mitigate the propagation of financial distress in the aftermath of the 2008246
financial crisis (Castrén and Rancan, 2014). In contrast, analysis of the sector level has, of247
course, the limitation of neglecting the diversity of the individual firms’ balance-sheet structure248
and the diversity in the maturity of the contracts. However, it also has the advantage in terms249
of its ability to identify the most relevant channels of shock transmission in the economy as250
it allows to identify the exposure between the sectors of the economy through exposures of the251
leading firms in these sectors (see Proposition 2).252
In the following of this section, we will prove a useful result concerning the meaning of253
aggregate exposures that lends methodological rigor to the macro-network approach but has254
not yet been emphasized in the literature. To this end, we first need to provide a few definitions.255
Let us consider two sectors i and j, with firms l in the sector i, and firms m in the sector256
j. Then, let us denote the exposure of a firm l in the sector i to a firm m in the sector j257
through instrument k as aklm. Then, total assets of firms in the sector i through instrument258
k is Aki =
∑
l a
k
l , and total exposure of the sector i to the sector j through instrument k is259
Akij =
∑
l,m a
k
lm, where l ∈ i, and m ∈ j.260
Definition 1. The relative exposure of a given firm l in the sector i towards all firms in the261
sector j through instrument k is defined as262 ∑
m a
k
lm
akl
, (1)
where the sum goes over all firms m in the sector j to which the firm l is exposed.263
Definition 2. The weighted average of the relative exposure of the sector i to the sector j264
(weighted by total asset of firms in the sector i through instrument k) is265 ∑
l (a
k
l
∑
m a
k
lm
akl
)∑
l a
k
l
. (2)
Definition 3. The aggregate relative exposure of a sector i to a sector j through instrument k266
is defined as267
Akij
Aki
, (3)
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where Aki represents the total assets of a sector i invested through instrument k, and where Akij268
is the total exposure of a sector i to a sector j through instrument k.269
Proposition 1. The weighted average of the relative exposure of all firms l in a sector i to all270
firms m in a sector j, weighted by total assets of firms, through instrument k, coincides with271
the aggregate relative exposure of a sector i to a sector j through instrument k:272 ∑
l (a
k
l
∑
m a
k
lm
akl
)∑
l a
k
l
=
Akij
Aki
. (4)
273
Proof. See Appendix A.274
Proposition 2. Assumption: the top q actors by total assets represent (1− ) of total assets275
of sector i. Then, in the limit of → 0 the aggregate relative exposure of a sector i to a sector276
j coincides with the average of the exposures of the top q actors, weighted by their total assets,277
in sector i towards sector j.278
Proof. See Appendix A.279
The above result implies that if the distribution of actors’ total assets is skewed, then a280
large aggregate exposure between a sector i and a sector j implies large exposures of the top q281
actors (by their total assets) of a sector i to actors in the sector j. Notice that this statement is282
valid both for financial exposures (see Section 3.6.1) and for leverage links (see Section 3.6.2).283
In the following, we want to show how chains of exposures at the microeconomic level284
can give rise to chains of exposures at the macroeconomic level. In order to do so, we need285
to introduce the following definitions and in particular, the notions of financial micro- and286
macro-networks.287
Definition 4. A network is defined as a collection of items denoted as nodes, and a collection288
of ordered relations between pairs of items denoted as links. In a weighted network, links are289
associated with a real number in respect with a significance of the link (the bigger the number290
the more significant the link is). Further, if links can be of different types, the network is called291
multilayer, in the sense that each type of links corresponds to one layer.292
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Definition 5. A financial micro-network is a network with individual firms as nodes and links293
as financial interdependencies between these firms, usually, in terms of financial contracts (e.g.294
equity shares, bonds and loans holdings).295
Definition 6. A financial macro-network is a network in which nodes are economic sectors296
(e.g banks, non-financial firms, investment fund), and links are aggregate exposures among297
pairs of sectors along a specific type of financial instruments (i.e. equity, bonds, loans or298
insurance&pension schemes guarantees). Each type of a financial instrument marks a layer in299
the financial macro-network.300
Definition 7. A closed chain of exposures in the financial network is a chain of exposures301
between the nodes of the financial network either between firms or sectors that starts and ends302
in the same node of the financial network.303
It is possible to provide sufficient conditions for the existence of chains of exposures in304
the micro-network if there are exposures in the macro-network, as formalized in the following305
proposition.306
Proposition 3. Assumption: for each sector in a closed chain of exposures in a macro-network,307
all top q actors in a given sector i are linked to at least one of the top q actors in the following308
sector j in the chain. Then, there exist some closed chains of exposures in the micro-network309
of financial contracts between the firms in sectors i and j.310
Proof. See Appendix A.311
The above proposition implies that given a chain of exposures at the macro-level, and under312
the mild assumption stated there, there also exist chains at the micro-level. This means that313
although shocks propagate only at the micro-level i.e. from a firm to another through chains314
of individual contracts, it is also reasonable to talk about distress propagation from a sector315
to another through chains of aggregate exposures. The propagation of distress through the316
macro-network of financial exposures between the sectors is the result of the aggregation of317
shocks propagated through the financial contracts between individual firms. Thus, the shock318
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propagation through the macro-network reflects the aggregated shock propagation through the319
micro-network of financial contracts.320
Given that shocks propagate along individual contracts between the firms (micro-level) but321
individual contracts are not available, this is a strong argument to use the aggregate data for322
exposures between the sectors across different instruments as a proxy of individual exposures323
between the firms from these sectors. In other words, if the aggregate exposure of a sector324
i to a sector j is large relative to the aggregate balance sheet of a sector i, this implies that325
aggregate relative exposure of individual actors within sector i to individual actors in sector j326
is also large.327
Taking into account the argument above, in this study, we reconstruct and analyze a multi-328
layer financial macro-network of institutional sectors (see section 4.1 for data description, and329
Appendix Appendix B - for the detailed description of sectors), where links represent aggregate330
exposures among pairs of sectors along a specific type of financial instruments (i.e. equity,331
bonds, loans or insurance&pension schemes guarantees). The weight of a link represents the332
monetary value of the financial exposure (relative to total assets of the sector that bears the333
exposure) along a given instrument. Overall, since financial contracts vary in size across var-334
ious instruments (i.e. loans, equity, bonds, and insurance&pension schemes guarantees), the335
economy on a macro-level can be represented as a multilayer weighted and directed network.336
In this study, the direction of the link is specified from the sector which holds the asset to the337
sector which issues the asset.338
The balance sheet of institutional sector i (e.g. non-financial firms, banks, investment funds,339
other financial institutions, government, households, insurance&pension funds) at a given time340
t is described as follows:341
Ai(t) =
∑
j,k
Akij(t) + Si(t), (5)
where Ai is the value of total assets of an institutional sector i, Akij is the exposure of an342
institutional i to institutional sector j through instrument k, and Si is the rest of the assets343
(i.e. the total assets excluding equity shares, bond holdings, loans and deposits holdings,344
and holdings of insurance and pension schemes guarantees). In this paper we consider the345
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following institutional sectors (i,j): non-financial firms, banks, investment funds, other financial346
institutions, government, households, insurance&pension funds. The institutional sectors are347
linked through the following instruments (k): equity, bonds, loans, insurance&pension schemes348
guarantees.349
Taking into account that the exposure of the institutional sector i to institutional sector j350
is defined as Aij =
∑
k A
k
ij (since we consider a fixed time snapshot, we omit t), we define the351
relative exposure of the sector i to the sector j:352
Definition 8. The relative exposure of the sector i to the sector j is defined as follows:353
wij =
Aij
Ai
. (6)
3.2. Reinforcing and balancing feedback loops between the financial sectors and sectors of the354
real economy355
Here we extend the concept and the application of feedback loops (Sterman, 2000, 2002) to356
the context of the macro-network of financial interdependencies. This extension is relevant for357
the assessment of the overall impact of the introduction of a climate policy. Indeed, we assume358
that the introduction of a policy at time t0 leads to a direct shock (positive or negative) on359
assets of a target institutional sector i. Let us denote the shock as ∆Ai(t0), describing a change360
in a total assets of a targeted by policy institutional sector i at time t01. In the presence of361
chains of financial interdependencies among the institutional sectors, the shock can propagate362
from the sector i to other institutional sectors. Further, in the presence of a closed chain of363
financial dependencies (referred to as a cycle hereafter) the shock eventually travels back to364
the sector i where it originated. At this time, tn, the magnitude of the shock ∆Ai(tn) can365
either be amplified or dampened in comparison with the initial magnitude of the shock. In this366
paper, we refer to a reinforcing feedback loop in the case of amplification of a shock after the367
feedback loop, i.e. ∆xi(tn) > ∆xi(t0), and to a balancing feedback loop in the opposite case,368
e.g. ∆xi(tn) < ∆xi(t0) .369
1Note, that a shock can be considered as a change in any macroeconomic variable describing the institutional
sector, but for the sake of simplicity of notations, we use a shock on total assets from now on.
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Let us introduce two qualitative definitions of cycles and feedback loops to capture the370
presence of closed chains of dependencies that may result from the financial contracts. The371
reason why we need two different definitions is that sometimes the same financial contract372
can result in different types of dependencies, as a function of market conditions and agents’373
behavior.374
Definition 9. A closed chains of financial dependencies. Let us consider a sequence of sectors375
i, j, .... Let us assume that there is a macroeconomic variable x associated with the each sector376
in the sequence, and that there is a dependency between the sectors in the aforementioned377
sequence (e.g. xij) in a form of a causal relation between some of these sectors. A closed chain378
of dependencies of length n is a sequence of sectors i, i+ 1, ...i+ n− 1, i+ n, such that there is379
a causal relation between the variables of each pair of adjacent sectors in the sequence.380
Definition 10. Closed chain of financial contracts. A closed chain of financial contracts of length381
n is a sequence of sectors i, i+1, ...i+n−1, i+n, such that there is a financial contract between382
the each pair of adjacent sectors in the sequence.383
Definition 11. Reinforcing feedback loop. A closed chain of dependencies is a reinforcing384
feedback loop if the magnitude ∆Ai(tn) of the shock at tn is larger than the initial magnitude385
of the shock i.e. ∆Ai(tn) > ∆Ai(t0). The chain is a balancing feedback loop in the opposite386
case.387
388
Remark 2. Notice that in the above definition, a reinforcing feedback loop does not necessarily389
lead to an unstable dynamics of the shock. Indeed, the shock series ∆Ai(t0),∆Ai(tn),∆Ai(t2n), . . .390
can very well converge to a finite value. The amplification of the shock through the feedback391
loop: ∆Ai(t∞)/∆Ai(t0) is larger than one but finite in this case. Notice also that reinforcing392
feedback loops are also often called positive feedback loops but they are neither positive393
nor negative in the colloquial sense of the term. For instance, positive feedback loops can be394
detrimental for the economy if they amplify adverse shocks.395
16
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073191 
3.3. Chains of financial contracts and feedback loops396
In this section, we state some results on the relation between the chains of financial contracts397
and the feedback loops.398
Let us start with the simplest case of a closed chain of e.g. equity holdings in which firm399
i + 1 hold equity shares in a firm i etc. Following basic accounting principles, an increase400
in market value of a firm i leads to an increase in asset values for the next firm i + 1. By401
induction, this holds for all other firms in the chain including firm i itself. Whether this result402
is consistent with a general equilibrium valuation of equity and to what extent in the practice403
market players take these effect into account are open questions which we do not address here.404
Our goal is to identify the possible shock transmission channels due to the presence of chain of405
financial contracts between the firms.406
We then consider debt securities that mature at time T in the future and yield either their407
face value or a value equal to their face value times a recovery rate in case of default of the408
obligor. We assume that securities are valued today, based on available information and that409
their valuation is carried out in terms of their expected value at the maturity T , depending410
on the face value of the security and the default probability of the obligor at the maturity411
(Bardoscia et al., 2016; Barucca et al., 2016).412
It is intuitive that in the case that a negative shock occurs on the obligor today (adding up413
to the prior available information), its default probability goes up and the expected value of its414
debt security goes down. Therefore, under these assumptions, a closed chain of debt securities415
in which agent i + 1 holds debt securities of agent i, leads to a reinforcing feedback loop for416
an initial negative shock because each agent in the closed chain is affected negatively by the417
adverse shock on the previous one. Notice that, while the expected value of a tradable debt418
security, i.e. a bond, cannot exceed its face value, it can go up with respect to its previous value419
if the default of an obligor (i.e. the bond issuer) becomes less likely than before. The same420
holds for the expected value of a loan. Therefore, a closed chain of debt securities can lead421
to a reinforcing feedback loop even for a positive shock, with the limitation that the security422
value cannot exceed the face value. This limitation does not hold for equity holdings. The423
above considerations can be formalized in the following Propositions 4, 5, 6. In turn, these424
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propositions derive from the fact that financial contracts such as equity and debt securities425
preserve the sign of the shocks propagating from the obligor to the security holder, formalized426
in Proposition 4.427
Proposition 4. Shock Transmission and Sign of shocks. Financial contracts such as428
equity holdings and debt securities strictly preserve the sign of the shocks from the obligor to429
the security holder.430
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof.431
Proposition 5. Closed chains of equity holdings or debt securities and reinforcing432
feedback loops. The following closed chains of contracts can lead to a reinforcing feedback433
loop both in the case of an initial negative or positive shock: i) a closed chain of only equity434
holdings ii) a closed chain of only debt securities (e.g. both bonds and loans) iii) a closed chain435
including both equity holdings and debt securities.436
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof.437
Proposition 6. Closed chains of equity and debt securities and balancing feedback438
loops. A closed chain of contracts of equity or debt securities, either bonds or loans, can not439
lead to a balancing feedback loop both in the case of an initial negative or positive shock.440
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof.441
Since we exclude from our analysis financial derivatives at this stage, Proposition 6 implies442
that if we want to find balancing feedback loops in the financial network we need to look at443
different types of financial dependencies between the institutional sectors, such as those resulting444
from changes in the exposures between the institutional sectors due to e.g. mechanisms of445
supply and demand.446
3.4. Shock transmission channels in the financial sectors and sectors of the real economy447
The existence of chains of financial contracts can serve as a ground for shock transmission448
channels in the financial network. One can highlight two types of shock transmission channels.449
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The first type of channel materializes through changes in securities valuation. The simplest450
case of shock propagation in this case is a shock propagation through equity holdings. The451
asset of the holder changes in value proportionally to the market value of the issuer’s equity452
changes. Another case originates from valuation adjustments in debt securities along a chain453
of counterparties. This channel plays out when debt securities are valued in a mark-to-market454
environment. Table 1 lists examples of shock transmission cases depending on various financial455
contracts and the type of the shock transmission channel.456
The second type of shock propagation channel is a result of changes in investments/savings457
decisions along a chain of actors connected by financial contracts.458
The feedback loops between the financial sectors and sectors of the real economy resulting459
from financial contracts of equity and debt securities can be identified by exploiting the prop-460
erties of the adjacency matrix of a network. Indeed, the entries of the n-power of the weighted461
adjacency matrix of a network gives the sum of the products of the weights along the paths.462
Hence, the diagonal of n-th power of the matrix of financial exposures gives the magnitude of463
such a sum of products. In this paper, we limit our analysis to paths not longer than five2, and464
choose the most important paths including the highest financial exposures in percentage points465
(see Section 4).466
3.5. Climate policy shocks’ transmission channels467
There is a growing discussion around the role of different sets of climate policies to reach468
the 2◦C target. Market-based solutions (e.g. a carbon tax, or feed-in tariffs), command-control469
policies (e.g. an imposed limit to GHG emissions, Lamperti et al., 2016), more recent green470
macro-prudential regulations (HLEG-Sust-Fin, 2017) and green monetary policies (Monnin and471
2An empirical analysis for the Euro Area shows that the longer the chain of the financial contracts in the
feedback loop, the smaller is the shock amplification in this feedback loop. While analyzing the feedback loops
in the Euro Area we found that the shock amplification for the largest (in terms of financial exposures between
the sectors) feedback loop of lengths five is less than 1% for exposure links and less than 12% for leverage links
(see Tables 4,5, and Section 3.6). Therefore, we limit our analysis to the feedback loops of length no longer
than five as further increase of the feedback length leads to an insignificant shock amplification.
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Barkawi, 2015; Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018) are the most debated in the climate-finance472
policy arena, and, thus, the more likely to be introduced in the near-future (HLEG-Sust-Fin,473
2017). In addition, an economic assessment for these policies has already been provided.474
We analyze only a limited number of reinforcing feedback loops that can materialize through475
a re-evaluation of exposures for reasons of space. Indeed, the longer the feedback loop is,476
the smaller is the impact of an additional exposure to the shock amplification and, thus, the477
explanatory power of the feedback loop.478
The climate policies’ feedback loops are analyzed against a baseline of an early-and-gradual479
implementation of the climate policies when market players are able to smoothly adjust their480
expectations on prices as the policies phase-in. As a result, no systematic mispricing occurs481
and the shock propagation through the re-evaluation of contracts is negligible. However, if we482
consider a scenario of the late-and-sudden introduction of climate policies, market players are483
not able to fully anticipate price adjustments and that results in systematic mispricing, and484
shock propagation via financial contracts between the sectors that form feedback loops through485
which the shock get amplified.486
In particular, we focus on two types of feedback loops with respect to the sector where the487
initial shock originates, i.e. non-financial firms and banks. We start by analyzing how climate488
policy shocks originated in the non-financial firms affect other sectors, and how they come489
back to non-financial firms amplified through a reinforcing feedback loop. Similar analysis is490
performed for the policy shocks affecting first banks, and then propagating to other sectors,491
including the real economy, and then returning to banks.492
Climate policy shocks hitting banks could result from the introduction of unconventional493
monetary policies, such as green asset purchasing programs (i.e. a green Quantitative Easing494
(QE)), or from the introduction of financial regulation of the banking sector such as e.g. differ-495
ential capital requirements for green loans (i.e. green macroprudential policies). Policy shocks496
hitting non-financial firms could result, for instance, from the introduction of a carbon tax or497
other measures to limit carbon emissions that market players did not fully anticipate. The498
types of policies and policy shocks are listed in Table 2.499
For each type of climate policy, either affecting banks or non-financial firms, we perform a500
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policy evaluation. We consider i) policy’s effect on the institutional sectors, and ii) the feedback501
loops within the institutional sectors. The empirical analysis of the magnitudes of financial502
exposures between institutional sectors of the Euro Area allows us to qualitatively estimate503
the effects of climate policies and to point out specific feedback loops that could emerge in the504
Euro Area economy. This information, despite being still missing from the policy debate, is505
key to assess the overall effect of the climate policies during the climate policy implementation506
and evaluation phases.507
3.6. Climate policy shocks’ transmission through the macro-network of financial interdependen-508
cies509
In the following section, we discuss the relation between the magnitude of the shock am-510
plification through a feedback loop considering two types of potential shock transmission: i)511
through exposure amplification, and ii) through leverage amplification. We also provide ana-512
lytical formulas for the computation of the policy shock amplification, which is crucial for the513
assessment of the climate policy shock transmission.514
3.6.1. Financial shocks transmission through exposures between the institutional sectors.515
The mechanism of the shock propagation and accumulation can be described as follows.516
Let us consider a simple scenario of two institutional sectors with assets Ai and Aj, and their517
mutual exposures Aij and Aji, respectively. Then, in case of an initial shock ∆Ai(t0) to a sector518
i (where the shock - ∆Ai(t0) - shows changes in assets of the sector i), in the first round of519
shock propagation, a sector j, will have a shock:520
∆Aj(t1) = Aji · ∆Ai(t0)
Ai
, (7)
In the second round, the shock will come back to the sector i, and the resulted shock of this521
sector will be:522
∆Ai(t2) = Aij · ∆Aj(t1)
Aj
=
Aij
Aj
· Aij · ∆Ai(t0)
Ai
= ∆Ai(t0) · wij · wji. (8)
where wij is the relative exposure of the sector i to the sector j (defined as in equation 6). In523
the more general case of a shock reverberation through the feedback loop of length n, the shock524
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hitting a sector i can be expressed through this sector’s shock in the previous round using this525
formula:526
∆Ai(tn) = ∆Ai(t0) · (wij · wjm · . . . · wni), (9)
where ∆Ai(tn) is a shock hitting a sector i after one reverberation through the feedback loop527
of length n, ∆Ai(t0) is an initial shock hitting a sector i, and wjm · . . . · wni are normalized by528
total assets exposures between the sectors along the chain of financial contracts.529
The shock amplification described by equation 9 could occur when one considers holdings530
of equity shares, as the effect of the shock on the equity holdings can be viewed as proportional531
to the shock in both cases of positive and negative shock. In contrast, a bond or a loan can532
not pay more than their nominal value. However, conditional upon a positive shock on the533
creditworthiness of the issuer, the expected value of the loan can increase if it was lower than534
nominal value.535
Definition 12. We define as number of reverberations in the feedback loop the number of times536
that an initial shock returns to the sector i where it originated.537
Let us consider the simple case of a feedback loop of length two between two sectors. Then,538
in the case of an infinite number of reverberations through the feedback loop, the magnitude539
of the cumulative shock on the sector i is:540
∆Ai(∞) = ∆Ai(t0) + ∆Ai(t2) + ∆Ai(t2n) + . . . =
∞∑
n=0
∆Ai(t2n) = ∆Ai(t0) + ∆Ai(t0)wijwji+
∆Ai(t0)(wijwji)
2 + ∆Ai(t0)(wijwji)
3 + . . . = ∆Ai(t1)
∞∑
n=0
(wijwji)
k = ∆Ai(t0)
1
1− wijwji .
(10)
541
We can generalize the notion to the following definition.542
Definition 13. Consider an infinite number of shock reverberations through a feedback loop of543
length n starting from sector i. The feedback loop exposure amplification is defined as the ratio544
of the cumulative shock over the initial shock to the sector i:545
Mi =
∆Ai(∞)
∆Ai(t0)
=
∞∑
k=0
(wij · wjm · . . . · wni)k= 1
1− wij · wjm · . . . · wni . (11)
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Notice that the sum in the above equation is always finite because the exposures wij, ...wmi546
are all smaller than one.547
3.6.2. Financial shocks transmission through leverage between the institutional sectors.548
When one takes into account i) the recovery rate of assets of a market player after the549
shock (Battiston et al., 2016a; D’Errico et al., 2017), ii) the balance sheet identities of individ-550
ual sectors, iii) an assumption of a simple rule for shocks’ transfer from borrowers to lenders551
(Bardoscia et al., 2015), it emerges that the shock propagation from one sector to another is552
not proportional to the exposure between the sectors but to their leverage, i.e. the ratio of553
the shock to the sector’s equity, calculated as the difference between assets and liabilities. In554
particular, financial shocks could be transmitted through the net leverage matrix.555
Definition 14. A net leverage matrix is defined (similar to Battiston et al.,2016a) as:556
λij =
Aij(1− r)
Ei
, (12)
where Aij is the exposure of an institutional sector i to a sector j, Ei is equity of a sector557
i (computed as a difference between assets and liabilities of the sector), and r is a recovery558
coefficient rate or recovery rate, i.e. a portion of assets of the institutional sector i that is559
recovered after a shock due to assets re-evaluation.560
Then, similarly to equation 7, in case of an initial shock ∆Ai(t0) to a sector i (where the561
shock ∆Ai(t0) shows changes in assets of the sector i), in the first round of shock propagation,562
a sector j, will have a shock proportional to the leverage:563
∆Aj(t1) = λji ·∆Ai(t0). (13)
Therefore, in case of conditions i)-iii) (considering a shock transmission through the leverage564
matrix), in the simple case of a feedback loop between the two sectors, equation 9 can be565
modified as:566
∆Ai(∞) = ∆Ai(t0)
∞∑
k=0
(λijλji)
k, (14)
where ∆Ai(t0) is an initial shock to the sector i, and λij is defined as in equation 12.567
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Similarly to equation 11, we can formulate the following definition.568
Definition 15. Consider an infinite number of shock reverberations through a feedback loop of569
length n starting from sector i. The feedback loop leverage amplification is defined as the ratio570
of the cumulative shock over the initial shock to the sector i:571
Mi =
∆Ai(∞)
∆Ai(t0)
=
∞∑
k=0
(λij · λjm · . . . · λni)k, (15)
where ∆Ai(∞) is a shock after the feedback loop amplification, and ∆Ai(t0) is an initial shock572
on the sector i.573
Notice also that if the recovery rate is one, r = 1, (i.e. a sector recovers all assets after574
a shock), then the amplification is one, Mi = 1 meaning that there is no shock amplification575
through the feedback loops.576
However, the sum in the above equation may be unbounded because the leverage components577
λij, ...λni can be larger than one (i.e. when a financial actor invests in the contracts with578
another one an amount larger than its own equity). In this case, we consider the value of the579
amplification after only one reverberation, defined as:580
M1i = 1 + λij · . . . · λni. (16)
581
In the simple case of a feedback loop of length two with equal exposure Aij = Aji between582
the two sectors with the same value of equity Ei = Ej, and recovery rate r the mathematical583
expression for the shock amplification ratio transforms into the following equation:584
Mi ∼ 1 +
(
Aij(1− r)
Ei
)2
, (17)
585
The definition of a feedback loop leverage amplification can be also extended to a more586
general case.587
Definition 16. A feedback loop leverage amplification Mi for all loops for a given sector i is588
defined as a sum of products of leverage matrix (equation 12) along all cycles of all length (for589
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all feedback loops L):590
Mi =
∞∑
s=0,n∈L
(λij · λjm · . . . · λni)s = 1 + λij · λji + . . . . (18)
According to Bardoscia et al. (2017), the existence of multiple unstable closed chains of591
contracts implies unstable distress propagation dynamics. Therefore, Mi > 1 implies shock592
propagation dynamics (applicable to both positive and negative shocks) through the feedback593
loops of financial contracts.594
4. Empirical Results595
In this section, we illustrate the analytical results obtained in Section 3 on an empirical596
dataset of financial exposures between the institutional sectors in the Euro Area. First, we597
identify the main feedback loops in the Euro Area financial macro-network (see Tables 4 and598
5). Second, we apply our methodology from Section 3 to estimate the climate policy shock599
amplification through the shock transmission mechanism via re-evaluation of financial contracts600
(e.g. equity). Finally, we also discuss some possible shock transmission mechanisms related601
to changes in investment decisions of market players regarding the size of existing financial602
exposures.603
4.1. Data on institutional sectors and financial exposures among sectors604
We consider the institutional sectors defined as according to the ECB classification (see605
Appendix B) as follows: Non-Financial Corporations (NFC, or non-financial firms), Banks606
or Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI, or banks), Non-MMF Investment Funds (IF), Other607
Financial Institutions (OFI) , Insurance Corporations and Pension Funds (I&PF), General608
Governments (Gov), Households (HH).609
We collected data from various data sets including bilateral financial exposures between610
institutional sectors of the Euro Area for eight types of financial instruments (listed equity,611
investment funds shares, short-term bonds, long-term bonds, short-term loans, long-term loans,612
deposits, insurance and pension schemes guarantees) and information on total financial assets613
and liabilities of the institutional sectors provided by the European Central Bank (ECB) Data614
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Warehouse3. In our analysis, we aggregate data on mutual exposures through short-term loans,615
long-term loans and deposits under " loans". Similarly, exposures through short-term (i.e.616
with maturity less than a year) and long-term (i.e. with maturity more than a year) bond617
holdings are aggregated under " bonds"; exposures through listed shares, unlisted shares and618
investment fund shares are aggregated under " equity"; exposures through insurance&pension619
schemes guarantees form a separate category. This aggregation allows to combine into one group620
instruments for which the effect of the shock to a counterparty resulting in the re-evaluation621
of the asset of an institutional sector is similar. This means that equity shares’ holdings are622
evaluated differently from the loan holdings. While the ECB provides data on mutual exposures623
of institutional sectors through listed shares and investment fund shares, unfortunately, it does624
not provide this information for the unlisted equity, which corresponds to 62% of the total equity625
holdings in the Euro Area. However, the ECB provides information on total holdings of the626
unlisted shares by each institutional sector. Most of this unlisted equity is represented by assets627
of non-financial corporations (41% of all equity shares of this sector), other financial institutions628
(46%) and government (26%), while for remaining institutional sectors the holdings of unlisted629
equity is less than 6% (with the exception of households - 14%) (see Table 3 for details of the630
assets of the Euro Area institutional sectors). Therefore, due to the lack of available data on631
mutual exposures between the institutional sectors through unlisted equity shares, we decide632
to take into account available data on unlisted equity shares’ holdings by each institutional633
sector. In order to reconstruct the bilateral exposures through unlisted equity between the634
institutional sectors, we assume the same percentage of allocation for unlisted equity shares635
from each institutional sector as for the listed equity shares of this institutional sector.636
Taking into account the collected bilateral data on mutual exposures between the sectors,637
the reconstructed data for mutual exposure through unlisted equity and the data on total638
financial assets of the institutional sectors, we reconstruct the multilayer weighted financial639
network. Each layer corresponds to one of the four financial instruments: equity shares, bond640
holdings, loans holdings and holdings of insurance&pension fund guarantees. The weighted641
3http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/
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link in the macro-network of institutional sectors is a total amount of monetary exposure642
between the institutional sectors through a chosen financial instrument (equity, bonds, loans643
and insurance&pension schemes guarantees) weighted by the total assets of the institutional644
sector for which the exposure is calculated. The link has the direction of the exposure: from645
an institutional sector holding an asset to an institutional sector issuing the asset.646
The ECB Data Warehouse provides data on mutual exposures between the institutional647
sectors of the Euro Area, as well as the total value of financial contracts through all instruments648
which Euro Area institutional sectors have with the rest of the world (non-Euro Area). However,649
the information about the institutional allocation of the exposures to and from the rest of the650
world is not identified. In order to overcome this limit, we reconstruct the financial exposure651
allocation outside of the Euro Area in terms of allocation of equity shares using a similar652
allocation to that between the institutional sectors as within Euro Area. Despite this might be653
considered as a strong assumption, it does not change the main channels of exposure between654
the institutional sectors as most of the assets of the Euro Area institutional sectors lie within655
Euro Area, except for equity and bonds holdings of the Euro Area investment funds to non-656
Euro Area. Taking into account that the majority of the equity shares is issued by non-financial657
firms in the Euro Area, it is reasonable to assume the same situation could characterize the658
non-Euro Area as well. Therefore, we use the percentage of issuance of equity shares by Euro659
Area institutional sectors to allocate the exposure of the Euro Area investment funds outside660
the Euro Area. For allocation of bonds and loans holdings, we used the same assumption.661
As in case of equity, this assumption only affected the investment funds of the Euro Area662
through bonds, as the rest of the institutional sectors of the Euro Area have their assets within663
Euro Area. The data on financial exposures among the institutional sectors through equity,664
bonds, loans and insurance and pension schemes guarantees used in the study correspond to665
outstanding amounts for the fourth quarter of 2015, due to the fact that corporate financial666
reporting is usually for the previous fiscal year and data analysis and consolidation takes some667
time.668
4.2. Shock propagation due to re-evaluation of financial contracts among institutional sectors.669
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In the following, we consider as a baseline an early-and-gradual implementation of the670
climate policies discussed in Section 3.5. In the baseline scenario, market players are able to671
smoothly adjust their expectations on prices as the policies phase-in. Thus, no systematic672
mispricing occurs and as result the shock propagation through the re-evaluation of contracts is673
negligible.674
Against such a baseline, we consider a scenario of the late-and-sudden introduction of the675
climate policies. In this scenario, market players are not able to fully anticipate price ad-676
justments and therefore there is potential for systematic mispricing and shock propagation677
via financial contracts. Accordingly, we analyze the macro-network of financial exposures be-678
tween the institutional sectors as in Q4, 2015 4. Then, we apply the methodology described679
in Section 3.6 to analyze how an initial climate policy shock on sector i (e.g. banks), with680
magnitude ∆Ai(0), gets amplified through a selected feedback loop (e.g. Banks→Banks). We681
then compare the results of the two shock transmission mechanisms described in Sections 3.6.1682
and 3.6.2: i) shock transmission through financial exposures between the institutional sectors,683
and ii) shock transmission through leverage between the institutional sectors.684
For each of the considered feedback loops we compute: i) the exposure amplification (see685
eq. 11), and ii) the leverage amplification (see eq. 15). The latter represents the magnitude of686
the climate policy shock amplification, e.g. by how much the initial climate policy shock gets687
amplified after a) one reverberation (M1i ) and b) an infinite number of reverberations (Mi).688
The results are presented in Tables 4, 5.689
We start with a scenario of a policy-induced shock affecting in the first place the banking690
sector directly (see loops 1-6 from Table 4). Visualizations of some of the feedback loops691
involving banks can be found in Figures 1,2,3.692
Based on the methodology described in Section 3, the shortest closed chain we can identify693
is the feedback loop of the sector Banks onto itself: Banks→Banks. As discussed in Section 3,694
we cannot assume that assets and liabilities can be netted out in the aggregate. In particular,695
financial exposures within the banking sector have been identified in the financial contagion lit-696
4http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/
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erature as a channel of shocks’ amplification that can be responsible for increasing the impact of697
an initial shock up to a factor two (related to the interbank leverage, see Battiston et al.,2016c).698
Using the described methodology, we compute the feedback loop exposure amplification and699
the feedback loop leverage amplification of a climate policy shock for the cases listed in Table700
4. Considering exposures through four financial instruments together (equity, bonds and loans,701
insurance&pension schemes guarantees), we find an exposure amplification of 1.4 (see column 4702
of Table 4). We also find a leverage amplification Mi that is unbounded (in the extreme case of703
r = 0), meaning that in mathematical terms a shock would get infinitely amplified through this704
feedback loop. In practice, of course, many factors intervene to bound the shock amplification.705
In this case, a more relevant estimate is provided by the amplification after one reverberation,706
M1i , defined in Section 3.6.2, which yields a value of 3.7.707
Similarly, we consider a scenario when a climate policy shock affects initially the non-708
financial firms. The most important feedback loops in this scenario are analyzed in Table709
5. Visualizations of some of the feedback loops involving non-financial firms can be found in710
Figures 4 and 5. We find that in case of climate policy shocks affecting firms (e.g. limits on711
carbon emissions, see row 2, Table 5), a feedback loop Firms→Banks→Firms can amplify712
the original climate policy shock by 2.2 times (considering four instruments combined), while a713
self-loop Firms→Firms yields an unbounded leverage amplification. The corresponding value714
of M1i (after one reverberation) is 2.6.715
For all considered feedback loops starting from both banks and firms, we have also analyzed716
the dependence of the shock amplification on the Loss-given-default, defined as (1− r), where717
r is the recovery rate, see Figure 6.718
The values of a feedback loop leverage amplification from column 4 of Tables 4 and 5 can719
be found from Figure 6 taking into account the recovery rate equal to 0 (Loss given default720
equal to 1).721
4.3. Shock propagation due to changes in the investment decisions of institutional sectors722
A simple example of climate policy shock propagation through the institutional sectors’723
investment decisions can be illustrated on a feedback loop of length two involving Banks and724
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Households: Banks→Households→Banks (see Figure 1). We can consider the situation of725
a positive shock on banks’ assets, for instance due to reduced capital requirements for "green"726
mortgages (i.e. mortgages for retrofitted, low-carbon housing facilities), see Table 4. Banks727
respond by increasing their lending for green mortgages, under the condition that households728
were previously credit-constrained on green mortgages and that they seek to increase their729
borrowing. The increase of green mortgages induces an increase in the value of green real-730
estate, which would then feed back into higher demand for loans for green mortgages. In this731
case, we can identify a reinforcing feedback loop starting from banks and returning to banks. A732
similar reasoning holds in the case of a negative shock on banks’ assets due to increased capital733
requirements for loans to "brown" mortgages (i.e. mortgages to not-retrofitted, high-carbon734
housing) as a result of the introduction of green macroprudential regulations (Table 4).735
A second example of a feedback loop of length two isBanks→Non-financial firms→Banks736
(see Figure 2). We can consider the situation of a positive shock on banks’ assets, for instance,737
induced by a green QE on the subset of banks with large green assets, see Table 4. If banks’738
liabilities remain unchanged, this shock also implies an increase in banks’ equity level. If739
banks have target leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2009; Tasca and Battiston, 2016; Monasterolo740
and Raberto, 2018), then they would increase their lending to non-financial firms (under the741
condition that firms were previously credit-constrained and that they seek to increase their742
borrowing). Assuming that firms use their increased borrowing to invest in productive capital743
with positive effects on their performance, this would lead on average to higher creditworthiness744
of the firms. As a result, the mark-to-market valuation of the loans granted by banks to the745
firms would increase on the banks’ asset side. This would lead in turn to a positive shock to746
the banks’ asset side of the balance sheet closing a reinforcing feedback loop.747
A similar reasoning holds for the case of a negative shock on some banks’ assets, for instance748
induced by tighter capital requirements on the subset of banks with large brown assets (Table 4).749
If banks’ liabilities remain unchanged, this shock would imply also a decrease in banks’ equity750
level. If banks have target leverage, then they would decrease their exposure to brown non-751
financial firms. In this case, the transmission channel is a change in investment decision along752
the loan linkage (see Table 3). Let us assume that a lower supply of funding would negatively753
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affect firms’ creditworthiness. Thus, the mark-to-market valuation of the loans granted to the754
brown firms decreases the banks’ asset side. This chain of effects illustrates a negative shock755
transmission through the reinforcing feedback loop Banks→Non-financial firms→Banks.756
Important to note that in the last step, the transmission channel is represented by the securities757
valuation of the loans themselves, but we could also consider the decrease of the level of deposits758
that non-financial firms hold in banks that would decrease the liquidity of the banks.759
5. Conclusions760
The introduction of climate policies to achieve the global climate and sustainability targets761
should consider the impact of the same policies on the financial sector in order to make finance762
part of the global sustainability solution. However, traditional economic models used for policy763
evaluation do not include a financial sector or represent it in a very simplistic way, neglecting764
financial interconnectedness and the transmission channels between the actors of the financial765
sector and those of the real economy. In addition, they focus their analysis of the policy766
effects on the institutional sector that the policy would target. This means that they neglect767
the possible feedback loops between sectors thus underestimating the overall – and sometimes768
unintended – effect of the policy on interconnected actors and sectors. Finally, it has been769
highlighted that the assumptions of agents’ rationality and market clearing prices cannot hold in770
the case of technological and climate policy shocks that characterize the low-carbon transition.771
Indeed, in case of systematic mispricing of assets (e.g. used as collateral of contracts, or that772
matter for calculation of loss-given-default), the recovery rate on contract values can be lower773
than one, thus implying counterparty risk. In this case, closed chains of collateralized financial774
contracts give rise to feedback loops that amplify negative shocks resulting from late-and-sudden775
climate policies.776
In this paper, we develop a methodology that relies on multilayer financial-real economy777
networks to provide a comprehensive assessment of the impact of climate policies’ shocks on778
the financial sector and the real economy, thus overcoming the limits of current approaches.779
Our methodology accounts for the amplification of climate policy shocks due to interlinkages780
among institutional sectors, and, in particular, due to feedback loops emerging in closed chains781
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of relations among institutional sectors.782
We focus on the shock transmission channel consisting of changes in the valuation of equity783
and debt securities conditional upon a shock on the asset side of the security issuer. We784
show that in this context a closed chain of common contracts (e.g. equity or debt securities)785
cannot lead to a balancing feedback loop. We also show that, under mild conditions, the786
distress propagation through financial contracts between the firms in different sectors can be787
aggregated and represented as a distress propagation through the macro-network of financial788
exposures between the sectors. In order to quantify the effects, we define two measures for789
the shock amplification assessment: feedback loop exposure amplification and feedback loop790
leverage amplification.791
We then apply our methodology to an empirical dataset of the Euro Area economy in the792
context of climate policies. By building on various data sources we reconstruct a macro-network793
of financial interdependencies in the Euro Area and identify the main feedback loops of financial794
interdependencies for the Euro Area. We analyze how climate policy shocks originated in the795
non-financial firms can affect other sectors, and how they come back to non-financial firms796
amplified through a reinforcing feedback loop. A similar analysis is performed for the policy797
shocks affecting first banks, then propagating to other sectors, including the real economy,798
and then returning to banks. We also discuss how shocks (positive or negative) on banks and799
non-financial firms could materialize as result of the introduction of a set of possible climate800
policies. Then, we compute the shock amplification in various scenarios including the case of801
the banking sector affected by green monetary policies (e.g. a green QE), or by green macro-802
prudential regulation, and the real economy affected through policies such as a “carbon tax”.803
We find that the magnitude of the amplification through the feedback loops can be substan-804
tial. The specific values of the amplification are critically dependent on recovery rate (r), which805
in turn is not easy to estimate and depends on policy action (e.g. asset purchasing programs).806
However, one of the insights of this analysis is obtained from the comparison of the amplification807
of different feedback loops (for given values of r involved). A larger feedback loop amplification808
implies a stronger ability of this feedback loop to amplify shocks. These results are important809
to understand the relevance of the relation between climate policies and finance, and the po-810
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tential systemic effects of climate policies on the stability of the financial sector and on the811
performance of the real economy. Thus, our methodology contributes to inform the design and812
implementation of climate policies that are effective and at the same time sustainable for the813
financial sector. Indeed, our analysis shows that a small positive/negative climate policy shock814
hitting the banking system could lead to a great amplification in the banks-households chain,815
and, eventually, result in great gains/losses for the banking system, with positive/negative816
implications for the real economy in case of the late-and-sudden introduction of the climate817
policies.818
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30%	
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Households	 Banks	(MFIs)	
Figure 1: Feedback loop: Banks→Households→Banks, financial exposures in the Euro Area, stocks (out-
standing amounts, fourth quarter of 2015). A pink arrow from households to banks shows deposits of households
in banks, an arrow in an opposite direction shows loans of banks to households; both arrows show relative ex-
posure (to total assets of the institutional sector).
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Figure 2: Feedback loop: Banks→Firms→Firms→Banks→Banks, financial exposures in the Euro Area,
stocks (outstanding amounts, fourth quarter of 2015). A pink arrow from non-financial firms to banks shows
deposits of firms in banks, an arrow in an opposite direction shows loans of banks to non-financial firms, self-
loops show between the non-financial firms and banks in the Euro Area; all arrows show relative exposure (to
total assets of the institutional sector). Note: shock propagates in the opposite direction of the exposure.
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Figure 3: Feedback loop: Banks→Government→Insurance&Pension funds→Households→Banks, fi-
nancial exposures in the Euro Area, stocks (outstanding amounts, fourth quarter of 2015). Pink arrow from
government to banks shows deposits of government in banks, an arrow from banks to households shows loans of
banks to households, purple arrow from households to insurance&pension funds shows life insurance and pension
schemes guarantees, blue arrow shows government bond holdings of insurance&pension funds; all arrows show
relative exposure (to total assets of the institutional sector). Note: shock propagates in the opposite direction
of the exposure.
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Figure 4: Feedback loop: Non-financial firms→Insurance&Pension funds→Households→Banks→non-
financial firms, financial exposures in the Euro Area, stocks (outstanding amounts, fourth quarter of 2015).
A pink arrow from non-financial firms to banks shows deposits of non-financial firms in banks, an arrow from
banks to households shows loans of banks to households, purple arrow from households to insurance&pension
funds shows life insurance and pension schemes guarantees, blue arrow shows corporate bond holdings of insur-
ance&pension funds; all arrows show relative exposure (to total assets of the institutional sector). Note: shock
propagates in the opposite direction of the exposure.
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Figure 5: Feedback loop: Non-financial firms→Investment funds→Insurance&Pension
funds→Households→Banks→non-financial firms, financial exposures in the Euro Area, stocks
(outstanding amounts, fourth quarter of 2015). A pink arrow from non-financial firms to banks shows deposits
of non-financial firms in banks, an arrow from banks to households shows loans of banks to households, purple
arrow from households to insurance&pension funds shows life insurance and pension schemes guarantees, blue
arrow from insurance&pension funds shows exposure of the Insurance&pension funds to investment funds
through investment fund shares (equity shares) and blue arrow from investment funds shows exposure of the
investment funds to non-financial firms; all arrows show relative exposure (to total assets of the institutional
sector). Note: shock propagates in the opposite direction of the exposure.
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Figure 6: Feedback loop leverage amplification (M) depending on the Loss given default that depends on
recovery rate (r) as (1− r). For all feedback loops except for self loops Banks→Banks and Firms→Firms, the
amplified shock converges to a fixed shock, and feedback loop leverage amplification (M) in case of an infinite
shock amplification through these feedback loops is finite. For the self-loops of banks and firms, while entering
the loop an infinite amount of times, feedback loop leverage amplification (M) increases at each entry and does
not converge, therefore, on the figure, M1 presented that corresponds to a single entry to the feedback loop as
a function of recovery rate of assets for Banks→Banks and Firms→Firms loops.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions984
Proposition 1 The weighted average of the relative exposure of all firms l in a sector i to all985
firms m in a sector j, weighted by total assets of firms, through instrument k, coincides with986
the aggregate relative exposure of a sector i to a sector j through instrument k:987 ∑
l (a
k
l
∑
m a
k
lm
akl
)∑
l a
k
l
=
Akij
Aki
. (A.1)
Proof of Proposition 1: The weighted average relative exposure of firms in a sector i to firms988
in a sector j through instrument k (weighed by total assets of firms l can be written as follows:989 ∑
l(a
k
l
∑
m a
k
lm
akl
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k
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. (A.2)
990
Proposition 2. Assumption: the top q actors by total assets represent (1 − ) of total assets991
of sector i. Then, in the limit of → 0 the aggregate relative exposure of a sector i to a sector992
j coincides with the average of the exposures of the top q actors, weighted by their total assets,993
in sector i towards sector j.994
Proof of Proposition 2: Proposition 2 can be also formulated as follows: if top q firms995
represent 1 −  of total assets of a sector i (where  is small) then the aggregate relative996
exposure of a sector i to a sector j (that coincides with the aggregate weighted exposure of997
actors in a sector i to actors in a sector j according to proposition 1) can be represented as998
a sum of the weighted average exposure of top q actors of the sector i to the sector j and a999
function of  (f()):1000
Akij
Aki
=
∑
lm a
k
lm
Aki
=
∑
qm a
k
qm
Aki
+
∑
sm a
k
sm
Aki
=
Akqm
Aki
+
Aksm
Aki
(A.3)
where Akqm =
∑
qm a
k
qm is exposure of the top q firms (by assets) of a sector i to firms m in1001
a sector j, and Aksm =
∑
qm a
k
sm is exposure of the rest firms (by assets) of a sector i to firms1002
m in a sector j. Taking into account that total assets of a sector i through instrument k can1003
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be decomposed as assets of the top q firms and assets of the rest firms s, the total assets of the1004
sector i through instrument k can be written as:1005
Aki = A
k
i (1− ) + Aki  (A.4)
Therefore, using Eq. A.4, equation A.3 can be written as follows:1006
Akqm
Aki
+
Aksm
Aki
=
Akqm
Aki (1− ) + Aki 
+
Aksm
Aki
=
(
Akqm
Aki (1− )
− A
k
qm
Aki (1− )
)
+
Aksm
Aki
(A.5)
Taking into account that Aksm that represents the exposure of the rest of the firms in a sector1007
l that are not included in the top q firms (by assets), the exposure of the rest of the firms to1008
firms m in the sector j can not be larger than total assets of these firms (which is equal to Aki ).1009
Therefore, one can represent the exposure of the rest firms in a sector i exposed to the sector1010
j as follows:1011
Aksm = αA
k
i , (A.6)
where α is a proportionality coefficient between the exposure of the rest firms in a sector i1012
to the firms in the sector j and the total assets of these firms, and α ≤ 1. Taking into account1013
equations A.6 and A.5, the aggregate relative exposure of a sector i to a sector j can be written1014
as follows:1015 (
Akqm
Aki (1− )
− A
k
qm
Aki (1− )
)
+
αAki
Aki
=
Akqm
Aki (1− )
+
(
α− A
k
qm
Aki (1− )
)
 = W kqj + β, (A.7)
where W kqj is the weighted average exposure of the top q firms (by their total assets) of a sector1016
i to a sector j (which following Proposition 1 coincides with aggregate relative exposure of top1017
q firms of a sector i to a sector j), and β =
(
α− Akqm
Aki (1−)
)
. Taking into account that α ≤ 1, and1018
Akqm
Aki (1−)
≤ 1, meaning that β ∼ 1, and assuming that  is small, thus, β is small too. Therefore,1019
the aggregate relative exposure of a sector i to a sector j with a high level of precision can be1020
represented by the weighted average of exposures of the top q firms (by their total assets) of a1021
sector i to firms in a sector j or by the aggregate relative exposure of the top q firms (by their1022
total assets) of a sector i to firms in a sector j.1023
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Proposition 3. Assumption: for each sector in a closed chain of exposures in a macro-network,1024
all top q actors in a given sector i are linked to at least one of the top q actors in the following1025
sector j in the chain. Then, there exist some closed chains of exposures in the micro-network1026
of financial contracts between the firms in sectors i and j.1027
Proof of Proposition 3. This proposition can be proofed by induction. Basis step: let us1028
consider a case of two sectors. If all top q actors of the sector 1 are linked to at least one (or1029
one) of top q actors in the sector 2. Fulfilling the assumption would also mean that all top q1030
actors of the sector 2 are linked to at least one of the top q actors in the sector 1. This results1031
in a closed chain of financial contracts on the micro-level between the sectors 1 and 2, as that1032
actor from the sector 2 that the firms from the sector 1 are connected to is linked back to the1033
sector 1 (considering the assumption). Therefore, the basic step is true. Inductive step: let us1034
suppose that the proposition holds for n sectors, and let us prove that it is also true for n+ 11035
sector. Taking into account that the proposition holds for the chain of n sector and considering1036
the assumption that all top q actors in the sector n are connected to at least one of the top q1037
actors in the sector 1, it means that there exists at least one closed chain in the micro-network1038
of financial contracts between the sectors 1, ..., n. Therefore, the proposition is proved.1039
Proposition 4. Shock Transmission and Sign of shocks. Financial contracts such as1040
equity holdings and debt securities strictly preserve the sign of the shocks from the obligor to1041
the security holder.1042
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows directly from the definition of the valuation of1043
these two types of securities. Taking into account that if a value of a debt security or equity1044
holding goes down, the assets of the holder decrease, while when the value of a debt security1045
or equity holding goes up, the assets of the holder increase. It is important to note that this1046
proposition can not be extended to the credit default swaps(CDS), in which case a negative1047
shock on the firm can lead to a positive shock for a CDS holder.1048
Proposition 5. Closed chains of equity holdings or debt securities and reinforcing1049
feedback loops. The following closed chains of contracts can lead to a reinforcing feedback1050
loop both in the case of an initial negative or positive shock: i) a closed chain of only equity1051
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holdings ii) a closed chain of only debt securities (e.g. both bonds and loans) iii) a closed chain1052
including both equity holdings and debt securities.1053
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of i) follows directly by induction from Proposition 1 in1054
the case of equity holdings and from the definition of reinforcing feedback loop. The proof of1055
ii) and iii) follow directly by induction from Proposition 1 in the case of debt securities and1056
from the definition of reinforcing feedback loop.1057
Remark 3. Items ii) and iii) are consistent with the fact that the expected value of the security1058
cannot exceed the face value (e.g. for bond, loan, deposits and insurance guarantees).1059
Proposition 6. Closed chains of equity and debt securities and balancing feedback1060
loops. A closed chain of contracts of equity or debt securities, either bonds or loans, can not1061
lead to a balancing feedback loop both in the case of an initial negative or positive shock.1062
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof follows directly by induction from Proposition 1 and from1063
the fact that a balancing feedback loop requires an odd number of changes in sign in the shock1064
transmission along the chain.1065
Appendix B. ECB definitions of institutional sectors1066
1. Non-Financial Corporations (NFC, or non-financial firms5) - corporations or quasi-corporations1067
that are not engaged in financial intermediation but are active primarily in the production1068
of market goods and non-financial services.1069
2. Banks or Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI, or banks) - financial institutions which1070
together form the money-issuing sector of the Euro Area. These include the Euro sys-1071
tem, resident credit institutions (as defined in EU law) and all other resident financial1072
institutions whose business is to receive deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits1073
from entities other than MFIs and, for their own account (at least in economic terms),1074
to grant credit and/or invest in securities. The latter group consists predominantly of1075
money market funds (MMFs).1076
5https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/index.en.html
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3. Non-MMF Investment Funds (IF). An investment fund is a supply of capital belonging1077
to numerous investors that is used to collectively purchase securities while each investor1078
retains ownership and control of his or her own shares. An investment fund provides a1079
broader selection of investment opportunities, greater management expertise and lower1080
investment fees than investors might be able to obtain on their own. According to Euro-1081
pean Central Bank Data Warehouse, IFs can be classified into bond funds, equity funds,1082
mixed funds, real estate funds, hedge funds, and other funds.1083
4. Other Financial Institutions (OFI). An OFI is a corporation or quasi-corporation other1084
than an insurance corporation and pension fund that is engaged mainly in financial in-1085
termediation by incurring liabilities in forms other than currency, deposits and/or close1086
substitutes for deposits from institutional entities other than MFIs, in particular those en-1087
gaged primarily in long-term financing, such as corporations engaged in financial leasing,1088
financial vehicle corporations created to be holders of securitized assets, financial holding1089
corporations, dealers in securities and derivatives (when dealing for their own account),1090
venture capital corporations and development capital companies.1091
5. Insurance Corporations and Pension Funds (I&PF). According to the ESA 2010, the in-1092
surance corporations subsector consists of all financial corporations and quasi-corporations1093
which are principally engaged in financial intermediation as a consequence of the pooling1094
of risks mainly in the form of direct insurance or reinsurance; the pension funds subsector1095
consists of all financial corporations and quasi-corporations which are principally engaged1096
in financial intermediation as a consequence of the pooling of social risks and needs of1097
the insured persons (social insurance). Pension funds as social insurance schemes provide1098
income in retirement, and often benefits for death and disability.1099
6. General Governments (Gov) - are defined as comprising resident entities that are engaged1100
primarily in the production of non-market goods and services intended for individual1101
and collective consumption and/or in the redistribution of national income and wealth.1102
Included are central, regional and local government authorities as well as social security1103
funds. Excluded are government-owned entities that conduct commercial operations,1104
such as public enterprises. Central governments include all administrative departments1105
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of the (central) state and other central agencies whose competence extends over the1106
entire economic territory, except for the administration of social security funds. State1107
governments comprise separate institutional units exercising some of the functions of1108
government (excluding the administration of social security funds) at a level below that1109
of the central government and above that of local government.1110
7. Households (HH) consists of one or more people who live in the same dwelling and also1111
share meals or living accommodation, and may consist of a single family or some other1112
grouping of people. A single dwelling will be considered to contain multiple households1113
if either meals or living space are not shared.1114
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Financial contract
type
Shock transmission
channel type
Examples
Equity holdings Securities valuation
An increase (decrease) in market value of
firm’s equity increases (decreases) the value
of the shareholder’s asset.
Debt securities
holdings
Securities valuation
A decrease in equity (difference between
assets and liabilities) of a debt security issuer
decreases the market value of this debt security
that in turn decreases asset of holder of this
debt security.
Loans Securities valuation
A decrease in creditworthiness of a firm
induces a decrease in the value of the lending
bank’s assets.
Insurance&pension
schemes guarantees
Securities valuation
A decrease in income flow from a households’
pension scheme induces a deterioration of the
household’s creditworthiness.
Deposit, loans,bonds,
equity holdings
Changes in saving/
investments decisions
A shock on a bank asset induces depositors to
withdraw their funds (bank run). This, in turn,
leads to a decrease in the creditworthiness
of the bank.
Table 1: Types of shock transmission channels through financial contracts between the actors.
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Policy shock
sector of origin
Policy type Policy example Direct policy impact
Banks
Unconventional
monetary policies
Green asset
purchasing
programs (green
QE)
Positive shock for banks holding
green assets
Banks
Macroprudential
financial
regulation
Differential capital
requirements for
green loans
Positive shock for banks with large
holdings of green loans, negative for
those with large holdings of carbon
-intense loans
Non-financial
firms
Market-based
solutions
Carbon tax/
carbon price
Positive shock for firms in green
sectors, negative shock for those in
carbon-intense sectors
Non-financial
firms
Environmental
regulation
Limits on carbon
emissions
Positive shock for firms in low
-carbon sectors, negative for carbon
-intense sectors
Table 2: Types of policies and policy shocks analyzed.
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Balance sheet/
Sector
Non-fin.
firms
Banks
Invest.
funds
Other Fin.
Inst.
Ins.&
pens.
funds
Gov.
House-
holds
Equity
(unlisted)
7.5
(41%)
1.4
(3%)
4.7
(1.7%)
6.7
(46%)
3.5
(5.6%)
1.4
(25.8%)
4.9
(13%)
Bonds 0.257 6.8 3.9 1.1 3.7 0.453 0.884
Loans/deposits 6.2 22.4 0.457 7.7 1.3 1.8 6.9
Insurance&pension - - - - 0.324 - 7.3
Equity=Assets-
Liabilities (except
for equity issued)
5.47 3.57 9.0 10.2 0.859 -7.4 15.1
Total Liabilities 31.6 31.9 9.8 18.9 9.0 12.5 7.0
Total assets 21.2 32.4 9.5 19.5 9.2 5 22
Table 3: Assets of the institutional sectors of the Euro Area by instrument: equity, bonds holdings and loans
holdings in trillion e.
55
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073191 
N Feedback loop Examples of shock
type/origin
Exposure
amplifi-
cation,
M
Leverage
amplifi-
cation, M
or (M1)
Figure
1
Banks→Banks
(self-loop)
Green asset purchasing pro-
grams
1.43 (3.73)
2
Banks→Firms
→Banks
Differential capital require-
ments for green loans
1.02 2.21
3
Banks→Firms
→Firms→Banks
→Banks
Differential capital require-
ments for green loans
1.00 (3.40) Figure 2
4
Banks→HH
→Banks
Green asset purchasing pro-
grams
1.06 3.60 Figure 1
5
Banks→Gov.
→Banks
Differential capital require-
ments for green loans
1.02 1.13
6
Banks→Gov.
→Ins.&Pens.
→HH→Banks
Differential capital require-
ments for green loans
1.00 1.16 Figure 3
Table 4: Examples of feedback loops originating in banks, examples of climate policy shocks, the magnitude of
amplification factor for exposure amplification and leverage amplification (with its upper bound for r=0). Rows
sorting: by increasing length of the feedback loop. Amplification values are computed for exposures through all
major financial instruments together (equity, bonds, loans, insurance&pension schemes guarantees) and for the
case of infinite number of entries in the feedback loop, except for values in brackets, that corresponds to a single
entry to the feedback loop. Note: For most of the feedback loops analyzed, multiple entries to the loop results in
an increased but finite shock amplification. For the loops that infinitely amplify the shock, we compute only the
amplification through the first entry of the loop (M1 value in brackets). The shocks’ amplification corresponds
to the recovery rate equal to zero (r = 0). This Table lists only several examples of climate policies that are
discussed in the literature the most. Listed feedback loops are the largest by financial exposure with length up to
five sectors (Section 3.3).
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N Feedback loop Examples of shock
type/origin
Exposure
amplifi-
cation,
M
Leverage
amplifi-
cation, M
or (M1)
Figure
1 Firms→Firms
(self-loop)
Carbon tax/carbon price 1.71 (2.60)
2 Firms→Banks→
Firms
Limits on carbon emissions 1.02 2.21
3 Firms→
Insur.&Pens.→
HH→Banks→
Firms
Environmental regulation of
firms
1.00 1.36 Figure 4
4 Firms→Inv.
funds→
Insur.&Pens.→
HH→Banks→
Firms
Environmental regulation of
firms
1.00 1.12 Figure 5
Table 5: Examples of feedback loops originating in the firms sector, examples of climate policy shocks, the
magnitude of amplification factor for exposure amplification and leverage amplification (with its upper bound
for r=0). Rows sorting: by increasing length of the feedback loop. Amplification values are computed for
exposures through all major financial instruments together (equity, bonds, loans, insurance&pension schemes
guarantees) and for the case of infinite number of entries in the feedback loop, except for values in brackets,
that correspond to a single entry to the feedback loop. Note: For most of the feedback loops analyzed, multiple
entries to the loop result in an increased but finite shock amplification. For the loops that infinitely amplify the
shock, we compute only the amplification through the first entry of the loop. The shocks’ amplification presented
in columns 5 and 6 corresponds to the recovery rate equal to zero (r = 0). This Table lists only several examples
of climate policies that are discussed in the literature the most. The feedback loops listed in this Table are the
largest feedback loops in terms of financial exposure between the sectors, with feedback loop length up to five
sectors (please see Section 3.3 for details).
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